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The story of the recent financial crisis that Taka Ito tells in his paper is one 
that I mostly agree with and so my role as a discussant will be to add some 
nuances to the story he tells . There are two issues I would like to address . First 
is whether Taka puts too much emphasis on the Lehman Brothers collapse in 
his discussion of the evolution of the financial crisis . Second is his assessment of 
the policy response .
The role of the lehman Brothers Bankruptcy  
in the Financial meltdown
Taka emphasizes the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, as 
the key event that tipped the financial system into a deep crisis when it com-
pletely seized up, with devastating effects on the economy . His is the common 
view, but I think it leaves out two other key elements that are extremely impor-
tant to understanding the resulting severity of the financial crisis: the AIG col-
lapse and the initial reaction of the U .S . government to obtaining bailout funds 
to deal with the crisis .
The first element is the AIG collapse on September 16, which was indeed 
triggered by the Lehman bankruptcy . The collapse of AIG revealed that the rot 
in the financial system was far deeper than the problems created by delinquen-
cies in the subprime mortgage market . Up until the AIG collapse, the view in 
the markets was that the problems in the financial system were primarily due 
to lax lending standards in the subprime mortgage market that were leading 
to large losses on securities that were backed by subprime mortgages as these 
mortgages defaulted . Because the subprime market was only a small percent-
age of total capital markets, it looked like the problems in the subprime market, 
although serious, could be contained .
After the Bear Stearns bailout, it was common knowledge that Lehman 
was very exposed to losses on subprime mortgage securities and that there was 
a distinct possibility that Lehman might go bankrupt . As a result, the market 
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was more prepared for a possible Lehman bankruptcy . AIG was, in contrast, 
a much bigger surprise to the market . It was not until September of 2008 that 
there was any inkling that AIG had made such big bets in the credit default 
swap (CDS) market . When Lehman failed and AIG required a massive rescue 
by both the Federal Reserve and the U .S . Treasury, it became clear that huge 
carry trades were the norm, not the exception, in the financial system . That is, 
financial firms were booking huge profits (in AIG’s case premiums on the CDSs) 
as long as financial markets remained healthy, but if tail risks materialized, the 
losses would be astronomical . The collapse of AIG therefore revealed how risky 
the financial system had become and that any further systemic shocks to the 
financial system could result in a complete breakdown .
The initial attempt to obtain government bailout funds to deal with the cri-
sis was another element of the crisis that deserves more attention . When think-
ing about the costs of a financial crisis, it is important to recognize that the 
loss of confidence is a key driving force of financial panics . In the wake of Leh-
man and AIG, when the Treasury first went to Congress to ask for $700 bil-
lion for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), it presented them with an 
extraordinary three-page proposal with many elements that were clearly unac-
ceptable . Not only was it ridiculously brief, suggesting that the Treasury was 
insufficiently prepared to cope with the increased virulence of the financial cri-
sis, but it had provisions that the Treasury’s disbursement of funds would not be 
subject to any Congressional oversight, nor could the Treasury’s actions be sub-
ject to court review and lawsuits . This proposal was rightfully considered to be 
inconsistent with democratic principles, and it severely eroded confidence in the 
Treasury’s ability to cope with the crisis . Then when the TARP bill came up for 
a vote in Congress, it was voted down on September 29 and, most shockingly, it 
was President Bush’s own party, the Republicans, that opposed the Administra-
tion’s TARP bill . This vote indicated the weakness of the lame-duck Adminis-
tration’s ability to deal with the crisis . Then when the bill was passed, four days 
later on October 3, it was laden with special interest “Christmas presents,” with 
one of the most outrageous examples being an excise tax exemption for produc-
ers and exporters of certain wooden arrows for children .
To say the least, all these shenanigans did not inspire confidence in the U .S . 
government’s ability to cope with the crisis . The lack of confidence and outright 
fear in the financial markets was then manifest in the week following the pas-
sage of the TARP bill with the week beginning on October 6 showing the worst 
weekly decline in U .S . history . Credit spreads went through the roof over the 
next three weeks, with the Treasury bill to Eurodollar (TED) spread going to 
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is what drives financial crises, the collapse of AIG and the U .S . government 
response to the crisis in late September and early October should be seen as 
events that are every bit as important as the Lehman Brothers collapse .
Why is adding these elements to the story important? Because it bears on 
whether it was a mistake for the U .S . government to let Lehman slide into bank-
ruptcy . Although I agree with Taka that, in hindsight, letting Lehman go into 
bankruptcy was a serious mistake because the aftermath was a full-scale finan-
cial crisis . However, ex ante, it is not as clear . It is not obvious that a Lehman 
bankruptcy would have had such disastrous effects on the financial system if 
AIG had not engaged in its risky activities in the CDS market or if the U .S . gov-
ernment had shown that it was up to the task of containing the crisis . In that 
case, letting Lehman go bankrupt may have made sense because the alterna-
tive of a Lehman bailout would increase future moral hazard risk-taking in the 
financial markets .
The situation did not get better later in the fall of 2008 and the spring of 
2009 . The way the Treasury administered the TARP funds was, to put it mildly, 
highly problematic . The Treasury rightfully concluded quickly that buying 
troubled assets would not contain the crisis and so moved to using the TARP 
funds to inject capital into the banking system . However, the disbursement of 
these funds was grossly mismanaged . Because Treasury Secretary Paulson 
insisted that healthy as well as unhealthy banks should be encouraged (some-
times coerced) to take TARP funds, the funds were disbursed with very few 
restrictions on their use . This led to recipients of TARP funds paying out a sub-
stantial percentage to the stakeholders in the recipient firms . Something on 
the order of half of the funds was paid out in dividends to shareholders, while 
employees continued to receive large bonuses . Particularly egregious is that 
financial firms with huge debt overhangs were allowed to reduce their capital 
base by paying out dividends . This is, of course, exactly what the management 
should do if it is acting in the interest of the shareholders, and indeed this is 
what we teach our MBA students is part of managers’ fiduciary responsibility 
to maximize shareholder value . However, these payouts were clearly not in the 
public interest because the whole point of the TARP funds was to beef up banks’ 
capital so that they would be less likely to go under and so they would continue 
to make loans . Having half the money go out the door to shareholders and not 
into higher capital was a misuse of these funds and indicated that the govern-
ment response to the crisis was misguided .
The other problem with the administration of the TARP funds was that it 
poisoned the well for the allocation of additional funds to get the financial sys-
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Brothers and AIGs came out of the closet . The public was hopping mad about 
how the TARP funds were used to bail out “Wall Street” and provide payments 
to shareholders and bonuses to fat-cat bankers . Not surprisingly, when the new 
Obama Administration came in, it became abundantly clear that the Adminis-
tration was not going to ask for additional funds to shore up the financial sys-
tem, nor would it have been able to get those funds if needed .
By March of 2009, the situation got downright terrifying and the credit 
spreads hit their peaks . The fear was not unjustified . If another Lehman Broth-
ers had occurred at that time, the financial system would have imploded further 
and it is likely that a depression would have ensued . Luckily this did not hap-
pen, and the stress tests proposed by the U .S . Treasury revealed that the banks 
were not in as bad shape as some thought, and so the financial system began to 
recover .
A conclusion that I draw from this episode is that the lack of the U .S . gov-
ernment’s ability to cope effectively with the crisis was a key reason why the cri-
sis ended up being so severe . I would also add—although I am biased because I 
was a Federal Reserve insider who actively supported aggressive action by the 
Fed to contain the crisis—that the brave actions by Chairman Bernanke helped 
save the day and prevented a much more dire outcome . As Paul Volcker put it, 
the Federal Reserve went to the “very edge of its legal authority” to contain 
the crisis . I never viewed this as a criticism of the Fed because Volcker was just 
stating a fact . I believe that the Fed’s actions were successful in promoting the 
recovery in the financial system that we see today . This does not mean that they 
are not controversial . There will be serious consequences from these actions 
because they will increase moral hazard incentives to take on additional risk in 
the future unless these perverse incentives are restricted by appropriate reg-
ulation and supervision of the financial system . In addition, these actions have 
spurred criticisms of the Fed that are leading to the most serious attacks on 
the Federal Reserve’s independence in its history . Nonetheless, these actions 
helped avert a depression, and given the tradeoffs, I strongly believe that the 
Fed did the right thing .
Assessment of the Policy response
I agree with Taka on his characterization of the difference between quantita-
tive easing (QE) and credit easing (CE) . Quantitative easing, which is what the 
Bank of Japan pursued in the late 1990s and early 2000s, involves an expan-
sion of the liabilities side of bank balance sheets . Credit easing, on the other 
hand, which is what the Federal Reserve has been engaging in during this cri-
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I would put a slightly different slant on this distinction . Quantitative eas-
ing is a monetary action to expand bank balance sheets that has traditional 
expansionary effects by increasing money supply growth and raising expecta-
tions of future money supply growth along the lines that Auerbach and Obst-
feld (2005) have articulated . In contrast, credit easing is focused on repairing 
credit markets so they can function normally again . Credit easing does involve 
an expansion of liquidity, but in contrast to quantitative easing, it is not focused 
on expanding the money supply, but rather on lowering credit spreads and mak-
ing credit more readily available to jump-start the economy .
I also agree with Taka that the measures taken by the Federal Reserve 
were necessary and have helped stabilize financial markets and the economy . 
On the other hand, I think that Taka needs to address critics of the Federal 
Reserve actions, such as John Taylor (2009) to bolster his case .
Taka also discusses the role of inflation targeting in dealing with a financial 
crisis . He discusses the Bank of England’s difficulties in meeting its inflation 
target . In the November 2008 and February 2009 Inflation Reports, the Bank 
of England indicated that it would not achieve its 2 percent inflation target even 
over the coming three years . Taka then asks whether the Bank of England was 
abandoning inflation targeting or was incompetent at achieving its target?
I believe that the answers to the two questions are no . The shock from the 
financial crisis was so large and unforeseen that missing the inflation target 
would have been the result even if monetary policy had been optimal on an ex 
ante basis . However, Taka’s questions raise several issues about the conduct of 
inflation targeting when an economy is hit by a massive financial shock of the 
type we have recently experienced .
Some critics of inflation targeting have argued that this recent episode casts 
doubts on the effectiveness of inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy . 
I strongly disagree . The lesson that should be learned from the recent crisis is 
that inflation targeting needs to be very flexible . A criticism of the conduct of 
some inflation targeting regimes that I brought up in the past (Mishkin 2005) 
is that some regimes, particularly the Bank of England, have given the impres-
sion that they were always trying to hit an inflation target at a set horizon, 
two years in the case of the Bank of England . However, optimal monetary pol-
icy would never set a fixed horizon for achieving an inflation target because, as 
Svensson (1997) has shown, when there is a concern about output fluctuations, 
as there should be, and the inflation rate is shocked sufficiently away from its 
long-run target, the path for the medium-term inflation target horizon needs to 
be modified . The recent financial crisis was exactly such a shock and it was suf-
ficiently large that the horizon for hitting the inflation target would need to be 256	 ASIA ECONOMIC POLICY CONFERENCE  ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
lengthened substantially . In my discussion of the possibility that the horizon 
would have to be modified in Mishkin (2005), I discussed the case of an inflation 
overshoot as occurred in Brazil in 2002 and 2003 and how the Brazilian central 
bank handled this well by lengthening the horizon for its inflation target . This 
argument is just as valid for an undershoot of the inflation target that comes 
from a contractionary shock like the one we have experienced recently . The pos-
sibility of negative shocks to the financial system support increased flexibility 
for inflation targeting regimes .
But can inflation targeting help a central bank deal with a financial crisis? 
The answer is yes . Financial crises are contractionary and so actions to stabi-
lize inflation are also ones that help stabilize economic activity . Furthermore 
the expectation that action will be taken to keep inflation from falling during a 
financial crisis makes monetary policy more effective in coping with the crisis . 
By preventing inflation expectations from falling, inflation targeting helps keep 
real interest rates from rising, which helps stabilize both financial markets and 
economic activity .
In addition, as I have argued in Mishkin (2008), preemptive actions when a 
financial disruption occurs are crucial to preventing more serious negative out-
comes as a result of financial shocks . However, these preemptive actions would 
be counterproductive if they caused an increase in inflation expectations and 
the underlying rate of inflation; in other words, the flexibility to act preemp-
tively against a financial disruption presumes that inflation expectations are 
well anchored and unlikely to rise during a period of temporary monetary eas-
ing . Inflation targeting can be extremely helpful in anchoring inflation expecta-
tions and therefore can be very helpful in enabling the central bank to effectively 
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